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I. Introduction 
One of the truly distinguishing characteristics of multinational firms (MNFs) is the intra-firm 
transactions among units located in different countries. The MNF is not constrained by market 
forces in setting the terms, in particular, the transfer price, at which such transactions take place. 
Although the MNF literature frequently assumes [12; l ; 25; 17] that the MNF faces government 
regulations, or a threat of a regulation, on its transfer price, most authors [3; 20; 9; 19; 18; 21; 7; 
4] who have written on this subject have expressed doubts whether a legal policy (if it exists) on 
the transfer price can be effectively implemented. For example, Katrak [ 18, 509] states, 
"Bearing in mind the size and influence of some multi-national firms relative to that of some 
nation states, is it realistic to assume that a nation state can easily impose monopoly-regulation 
policies on multi-nationals? . . . the literature on the subject has frequent references to the 
contrary." 
Hood and Young [11] report that the percentage of less than wholly owned subsidiaries is large, 
and is increasing. Thus, for the U.S. based  MNFs, the proportion of not wholly owned 
subsidiaries established increased from 42 percent in the period prior to 1951 to 56 percent in the 
years 1971-75; for Europe-based MNFs, it increased from 61 percent before 1951 to 81 percent 
during 1966-70; and for other MNFs it increased from 73 percent to 94 percent. Thus, the foreign 
subsidiaries are generally not wholly owned. The literature, however, has not analyzed transfer 
pricing in that situation. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the MNF's transfer pricing strategy when its subsidiary 
could be less than wholly owned. Lack of an effective regulation (or, its threat) on the transfer 
price is also assumed. Although the former can be introduced by a straightforward extension of 
the existing MNF models, it is found to have the dominant influence on the MNF's transfer 
pricing strategy; generally changing it from desiring a "low" transfer price (LTP) to wanting an 
"high" transfer price (HTP). We find that an HTP can increase the revenue of the host 
government while Metzler paradox (implying a fall in domestic price or output of the import 
good as a result of a tariff [22]) is not possible when domestic monopoly has its own affiliate as 
the foreign supplier. Further, and paradoxically, it is shown here that an increase in the tariff rate 
increases the transfer price (the foreign price of imports) if imports decrease substantially. 
*I wish to thank Professor Josef Hadar and an anonymous referee for comments on an earlier 
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The plan of the paper is as follows. We present the model and allow for less than wholly owned 
subsidiary in section II. Section III examines the determination of the profit-maximizing transfer 
price. In section IV maximization of the profit function with respect to sales and exports is 
investigated and effects of a tariff change are studied. Section V gives a summary of the main 
conclusions. 
II.  Profit Function and Non-Wholly Owned Subsidiary 
Consider a MNF producing and selling a final good in two countries. It produces under 
increasing costs and cost/revenue considerations are such that it exports a part of its output from 
the parent firm in Country 1 (source or home country) to its affiliate in Country 2 (host or foreign 
country). An exchange rate of unity between the currencies of the two countries is assumed. Let 
πi, ti, si, xi, Ri (si), Ci (xi), ci, r’i and c'i represent gross pure profits, aggregate profit tax rate, sales, 
production, total revenue and total cost (including  normal profits) functions, marginal  revenue, 
marginal cost, and slopes of marginal revenue and marginal cost functions in Country i (i = 1, 2), 
and let Ti = ( 1 - ti ) .
1 The MNF faces imperfectly competitive markets in the two countries and 
price discrimination between the two countries is possible. Then, 
    π1 = R1 (s1) - C1 (s1 + m) + pm,   and   π2 = R2 (s2) - C2 (s2 - m) - p(1 + τ) m, 
 
where m are the MNF's imports from Country 1 to Country 2, p is the transfer price, and τ is the 
"ad valorem" tariff on imports in Country 2. Clearly, x1 = s1+ m , and x2 = s2 - m. 
The MNFs have ownership with control over the foreign affiliate. The control element is ensured 
if the parent firm has majority ownership over the foreign affiliate [19]. Let k be the proportion 
of the parent firm's ownership in the foreign affiliate. Then, for a subsidiary 1/2 < k ≤ 1, while 
for a branch, k = 1. 
The global net profit function, π , when less than complete ownership over the subsidiary is 
allowed, is now derived. In most source countries, the home country, while taxing the MNF's 
global gross profits, gives a tax credit for foreign taxes paid.2.3 The tax credit is, however, limited 
by the home tax on foreign profits. Thus, when 
Case 1: t1 ≥ t2 
The MNF pays t2kπ2 as taxes to the foreign country and receives an equal tax credit. Thus, 
               π = (π1 + kπ2)  –  t1(π1 + kπ2) - t2kπ2 + t2kπ2 = T1 (π1 + kπ2).                                                      (1) 
It shall be assumed in this paper that (π1 + k π2) > 0 This rules out both simultaneous losses in 
the foreign branch and the parent firm, and loss in one of them so large that it makes the MNF's 
overall gross profits negative. 
Case 2: t1< t2 
Like Case 1 above the profit function is the same irrespective of whether the foreign affiliate is a 
branch or a subsidiary. The MNF pays t2kπ2 in taxes to the foreign country but receives a tax 
credit of only t1kπ2. Thus, 
 π = (π1 + kπ2) – t1(π1 + kπ2) - t2kπ2 +t1kπ2 = T1π1 +T2 kπ2.   (2) 
 The forms of π derived by Horst [14], and ltagaki [15; 16] are similar to (1), and (2) 
above, although they restrict their discussion to a branch or a fully owned subsidiary. 
III.  Determination of the Transfer Price 
The MNF's choice problem is to choose s1, s2 m and p so as to maximize π. This problem can 
most suitably be examined by following a two-stage maximization procedure: it first maximizes 
π with respect to p  obtaining p  as a function of s1 , s2 and m ; it then substitutes this value of p in 
its objective function and maximizes it with respect to s1 , s2 and m . As will be shown shortly, 
there is a kink in the profit function (under certain conditions) when drawn against p , and πP 
does not exist at that point. Thus, the usual method of calculus is not suitable for maximizing π 
with respect to p . Optimization for the two cases is presented below: 
Case 1: t1 ≥ t2 
The MNF faces (1) as its objective function, and 
                                               πp = mT1 [1 - k (1 + τ)].                                     (3) 
 Horst [13] and Eden [6] consider wholly-owned versions of (1), and conclude that in that 
case the MNF always chooses a LTP. Shifting profits to Country 2 through a LTP saves tariff 
payments. But, if the foreign-affiliate is not wholly owned, the profits shifted to Country 2 have 
to be shared with the foreign residents. Less than  whole ownership over the  subsidiary  may 
thus make the MNF choose a completely different transfer pricing strategy from that when the 
subsidiary is wholly owned. Iff, 
                                      k( l + τ ) < l ,                                          (4) 
 
the MNF will shift profits to Country  1 rather than the other way round, i.e., an HTP would be 
desirable. As an extension, we examine how high a profitable transfer price is. Since an increase 
in p , with other variables constant, decreases π2  (and increases π1) monotonically, there exists a 
pu such that π2= 0 for p = pu . For p > pu the MNF incurs losses in Country 2. But, as stated 
above, that does not give it any tax benefits in Country  l and π  declines. π  drawn against p 
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Figure 1. Possible Shape of the Profit Function. 
 
looks like a roof and p = pu maximizes π . This is illustrated in Figure 1. Thus, a limit on how 
high a profitable transfer price is until profits in the subsidiary are zero.4 
 The value of pu can be obtained by solving the equation π2 = 0 for p . Thus, 
                                     pu = [ R2(s2) – C2(s2 - m) ] (1 + τ) m                      (5) 
A necessary condition for (4) is that τ < 100% while a sufficient condition is that both k  and τ 
should not be high. Thus, we may state the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 1. When t1 > t2 , the foreign affiliate is not a wholly owned subsidiary, the tariff 
rate is less than 100%, and both k and τ are not high so that k( 1 + τ) < 1 holds, the MNF 
chooses an HTP , and its optimum transfer price is given by (5).5 
 The effects of transfer pricing on the host government's revenues are now examined. Let 
V2 represent these revenues. Then , 
                   V2 = t2π2 + τ pm,  (6) 
 (∂V2/∂p) =  m (1 –  t2) [ τ – {t2 / (1  –  t2)} |]                                                                                    (7) 
 
 Clearly, (∂V2/∂p) is unambiguously negative only if τ ≤0. In this paper, τ > 0 is assumed. 
Then, the effects of  an HTP on Country 2's revenue depend  on the relative  magnitudes  of  τ 
and t2 . Increasing  the transfer price decreases  the importing  country's profit  tax  revenue.  But 
it increases  its tariff revenue  at the same time.  The literature on this subject assumes that the 
importing country loses revenue by an HTP. But the precise effects of transfer pricing on the two 
countries' revenues when tariffs exist have not been examined. If the increase in tariff revenue is 
greater than the decrease in profit tax revenue, the importing country's overall revenue, in fact, 
increases with an HTP so that it would have no obvious reason to be concerned about an HTP.6 
Case 2: t1 < t2 
The profit function now is given by (2). It can be shown with similar analysis that is this case, iff 
                                       k(1 + τ) – 1 < (t2 – t1) / (1 – t2)           (8) 
the optimum transfer price shall be pu . It may be noted that the k =1 version of (2) is the most 
widely used profit function in the MNF literature [12; 25; 6; 16]. Using this profit function, the 
literature concludes that the MNF charges a LTP iff the tariff rate is greater than the relative tax 
differential, (t2 – t1) / (1 – t2). But, when k < 1, k (1 + τ) - 1 = (1 + τ) (k - 1) + τ < τ.  Then,  
 (8) may hold (and the MNF may charge an HTP) even if the tariff rate dominates over the 
relative tax differential. Thus, allowing for a less than wholly owned subsidiary may again make 
the MNF change its strategy from one of desiring a LTP to that of wanting an HTP.7 
It can be seen that (4) is a sufficient, though not necessary, condition for (8). (4) gives pu as the 
optimum transfer price when t1 ≥ t2 while (8) gives the same solution for t1 < t2 . These two 
results can be combined and stated as: 
PROPOSITION  la. When the foreign  affiliate is not a wholly owned subsidiary,  the tariff rate 
is less than 100%, and both k and τ are not high, the MNF chooses an HTP , and its optimum 
transfer price is pu . 
The conditions for this proposition are fairly broad. Since a tariff rate of 100% or higher is 
generally not observable, the above proposition suggests that the dominant effect on the transfer 
price is likely to come from the extent of local shareholding in the subsidiary rather than from 
the tax rate differential and tariffs. Caves [2, 87] notes that joint ownership exacerbates the 
problems of pricing of intra-firm transactions. The above analysis reinforces such statements in 
the literature, and formally investigates, perhaps for the first time, the effects of less than whole 
ownership over the subsidiary on transfer pricing. 
The profit-maximizing transfer price given by (5) is a negative function of the tariff rate while 
the operational profit in Country 2, (R2 - C2 ), affects it positively. There is nothing in this model 
to relate pu to the efficient or shadow transfer price, c1  [ 10]. If the operational profit in Country 
2 is low and the tariff rate high, pu could be low and could equal c1 . In that case, marginal gain 
in Country I due to exports from there is zero. Global profitability of exports then implies (for 
both the cases discussed above) that imports in Country 2 provide marginal gains to the MNF,  
i.e., pτ *  < c2 .8 At a "high" tariff rate, this last condition is likely to be satisfied if marginal cost 
of production in the importing country is also high. Thus, the profit-maximizing transfer price, 
pu, on exports from Country 1 to Country 2 can equal the efficient transfer price, c1, if both the 
tariff rate and the marginal cost of production  in Country 2 are high, and its operational profits 
there are low. 
 
IV.  Optimum Levels of Sales and Exports and Effects of Tariffs 
Second stage of the maximization exercise is now performed in which the solution for the transfer 
price is substituted in π, and π is optimized with respect to sales and exports.9 The solution, given 
by (5), makes π2 = 0, and the MNF's global net profit function takes the form π = T1 π1. 
Substituting (5) in π = T1 π1, we get 
 
π = T1 {R1(s1) – C1 (s1 + m) + [R2(s2) – C2 (s2 + m)] / (1 + τ) ]}.            (9) 
(9) shows that although π at this stage equalsT1π1, due to the substitution of p = pu, it is a function 
of variables in both the countries.  
Assuming the existence of an interior maximum, viz. s1 > 0, s2 ≥  m > 0, the first order 
conditions yield  
 
     (1 + τ) (r1 – c1) = 0,  (10) 
     (r2 – c2) = 0,  (11) 
c2 - (1 + τ) c1 = 0.  (12) 
The second order conditions are derived in the Appendix, and are satisfied under the usual 
assumptions of declining marginal revenues and increasing marginal costs in the two countries so 
that the solution vector (s1, s2, m) given by (10) - (12) is indeed the unique maximum.
10  
The effects of changes in the tariff rate on s1, m, and x1, i = 1,2, (derived in the Appendix) show 
that exports from Country 1 decrease even though, given increasing costs, its cost advantage  
increases; and the output in Country 2 increases. Let p2(s2) represent the domestic price in 
Country 2. Then,  
 
dp2/dτ = (dp2, /ds2) + (ds2/dτ) > 0  (13) 
 
(since the MNF faces downward sloping demand curves in both the countries). Thus, the Metzler 
paradox, implying a fall in the domestic price or output of the import good as a result of a tariff,  
is not possible in this model. This is in contrast to Finger [8] and Panagariya [23] who show, in 
partial and general equilibrium models, respectively, that Metzler paradox  may arise in the 
presence of domestic monopoly. But they do not consider a multi-national monopoly, and 
assume that the domestic monopoly imports from unrelated parties. Thus, tariffs can be expected 
to have protective effect when domestic monopoly has its own affiliate as the foreign supplier. 
 The effect on the transfer price is derived below: 
dpu / dτ = (c2 / τ*m) (dm / dτ) – (pu / τ*)[ (τ* / m).(dm / d τ) + 1]. 
But,  
 
dm / dτ = (dm / dτ*) (dτ* / dτ) = dm/dτ*  
so that,  
 
dpu / dτ = (c2 / τ*m) (dm / dτ) – (pu / τ*) [Emτ* + 1],   (14) 
 
where Emτ* = (τ* / m) . (dm / dτ*) < 0 is the elasticity of imports with respect to tariffs. Clearly, 
dpu / dτ > 0 if Emτ* < - 1.  
 In the exogenous transfer price models, marginal changes in the tariff rate have no effect 
on the transfer price since given the tax rate differential and tariffs, the MNF would always be 
charging the highest or the lowest values permitted by the tax and custom authorities. In 
Samuelson [25] and Eden [6] these limiting values are functions of the MNF's decision variables. 
Then, as expected, the MNF changes its decision variables in such a way that its transfer price 
decreases with a tariff increase. In this paper, however, an increase in the tariff rate does not 
assure a country a decrease in the transfer price: if imports are elastic with respect to tariffs, the 
transfer price may rise. The different results arise because here the transfer price maximizes the 
MNF's net global profits rather than simply satisfy an exogenously given rule. 
 One implication of the above result may be noted. The transfer price is the foreign price 
of imports to the importing country. We find this can increase especially when the quantity of 
imports decreases substantially. Thus, the normal price-quantity relationship cannot always be 
expected to hold for foreign supply when a large part of a country's trade is intra-firm. Some 
other results are: the host country satisfies the definition of a "large" country since it can affect 
the foreign price of imports. But even if the transfer price increases, the import bill, pm , 
decreases unambiguously, and the balance of trade of the host country improves. This is shown 
below: 
                           d(pum) / dτ = (c2 / τ*) (dm / dτ) - (pu / τ*) < 0.          (15) 
Thus, the MNF's tariff payments tend to decrease. Eden [5] had suggested that when the transfer 
price cannot be changed a decrease in imports acts as a substitute for decreasing the transfer 
price. We show that it can act as a substitute even when the transfer price can be changed. 
V.  Concluding Remarks 
In the transfer pricing literature, Horst [12] concludes that the MNF will generally charge a 
"low" transfer price  while  other authors are ambivalent  on this question. This paper  shows that  
less than whole ownership over the subsidiary generally makes the MNF change its transfer 
pricing strategy: from desiring a LTP to wanting an HTP. The conditions for an HTP are fairly 
broad so that we are more likely to observe it than has been suggested in the literature. The MNF 
literature also presumes that the host country loses revenue due to an HTP. However, this view 
ignores the effects of tariffs on a government's revenue. If tariff revenue is included an HTP can 
increase the host country's revenue. 
 Finger [8] and Panagariya [23] conclude that the Metzler paradox is possible in the 
presence of domestic monopoly. But they do not consider a multinational monopoly. We show 
that the Metzler paradox is not possible when domestic monopoly has its own affiliate as the 
foreign supplier. Further, it is shown here that the foreign price of imports (the transfer price) 
may increase with tariffs if imports decrease substantially. Thus, the normal price quantity 
relationship cannot be assumed for foreign supply when a large part of a country's trade is intra-
firm. 
Appendix 
Taking the total derivatives of the first order equations (10) -  (12) with respect to τ, we get  
 
 
  τ*(r´1 – c´1)      0         - τ*c´1             ds1 / dτ             0 
0    (r´2 - c
´
2)          c
’
2              ds2 / dτ      =       0 
                            -τ*c´1     c
´
2       - (c
´
2 + τ*c´1)      dm / dτ                 c1 
 
 
Let D represent the determinant of the above coefficient matrix. Then, in view of the 
assumptions made in the text, D and the elements on its principal diagonal are all negative and its 
second principal minor is positive. The second order conditions are thus satisfied. Solving by Cramer's 
rule, we have  
 
ds1 / dτ = τ*c1c´1 (r
´
2 - c
´
2)/D  > 0 
 
ds2 / dτ = - τ*c1c´2 (r
’
1 - c
’
1)/D < 0 
and  
 
dm / dτ = τ*c1 (r
´
1 - c
´
1) (r
´
2 - c
´
2) / D < 0 
 
Similarly,  
 
dx1/ dτ = (ds1 / dτ) + (dm / dτ) = τ*c1r´1 (r
´
2  - c
´
2)/D < 0, 
and  
 
dx2/ dτ = (ds2 /dτ) - (dm / dτ) = - τ*c1r´2 (r
´
1  -  c
´
1)/D > 0 
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Endnotes 
1.  Aggregate profit tax rate here means the profit tax rate plus the withholding tax on 
dividends. We assume that capital cost recovery allowances, other deductions or exemptions, and 
reduced tax rates or outright subsidies granted for particular activities or regions m most tax 
codes make the taxable profits approximately equal to pure profits so that the statutory profit tax 
is levied and realized on pure profits. 
2. The difference in tax treatment at home of income of a foreign branch from that of a 
foreign subsidiary may be noted. When it is a branch, it is treated as a legal extension of the 
parent firm, and Its income, whether positive or negative, is immediately recognized by the home 
country just like the income of the parent firm. On the other hand, when it is a subsidiary, which 
is incorporated in a foreign country under the foreign country's law, its profits are taxed in the 
home country only upon repatriation. Its losses, on the other hand, cannot be repatriated to the 
home country. The MNF thus does not gain any tax advantage m the home country by showing 
losses in the foreign subsidiary, and could always raise its π  by closing down such a subsidiary, i 
e., π2  ≥ 0. 
3. Absence of any loss carry-forward or carry-backward provisions is assumed, or, the 
period may be considered long-enough for any carry-over to be exhausted. Similarly, we assume 
that when the subsidiary earns positive profits, their repatriation is either not deferred, or, the 
period is considered long-enough for repatriation to take place. 
4. Although this meaning of the HTP may not be new, the MNF literature has not pursued 
this point. We work through the results on the assumption that a transfer price regulation either 
does not exist, or, if it exists, is so ineffective that the MNF ignores it. In addition, we show 
below that the host country's revenue. for example, may increase with an HTP so that it will have 
no obvious reason to impose a transfer price regulation. 
5. When (4) is not met, the  MNF chooses a LTP and an endogenous  solution  to Its 
optimizing  problem  does not exist. In what follows, we shall emphasize the conditions under 
which endogenous solutions of the transfer price are obtained. Also πp ≠ 0  shall be assumed. 
6.  It may be noted that the local shareholders in Country 2 earn positive pure profits when 
π2 > 0, and normal profits when π2 = 0. Even in the latter case, if they do not have any other 
equally secure investment giving a significantly higher return, they would also be in equilibrium 
(since they would be earning the opportunity cost of their capital). We assume that they are far 
too diffused and lack information to demand that the parent-firm always shares some of its pure 
profits with them.  
7.  Similarly, when the relative tax differential overrides the tariff, the introduction of a not 
wholly owned subsidiary will provide it an even greater incentive to charge an HTP since in that 
case k(1 + τ) – 1 < τ < (t2  – t1) / (1 – t2) 
8.  The derivative of the profit function (1) with respect to m is, πm = T1 [(p -  c1) + k (c2 - 
pτ*)]. When (p - c1) = 0, πm > 0 implies (c2 - pτ*) > 0. A similar conclusion can be drawn for the 
other profit function. In that case, marginal imports in Country 2 save more in production costs 
(by displacing production in that country) than add to import costs, i. e., they increase profits m 
Country 2. Although. given the parameter values, the MNF is interested in shifting profits out of 
Country 2, 1t does not achieve it by curtailing its profit-enhancing intra-firm trade but attains it 
by adjusting its transfer  price. 
9.  The following discussion is applicable only for situations for which we were able to 
obtain a determinate transfer price. 
10. It may be noted from (10) - (12) that the tax rates do not affect the decision variables 
although the profit function (9) Is a function of variables in both the countries It has been 
suggested in the internalizing literature [24) that transfer pricing counteracts exogenous market 
imperfections like differential taxes and tariffs. This paper supports internalizing literature as far 
as differential taxes are concerned. When the MNF can freely respond to differential taxes and 
tariffs, it chooses a transfer  price that makes marginal changes in the tax rates irrelevant. This 
suggests that the non-neutral tax effects derived by Itagaki [15), Samuelson [25), and Eden [7) 
could be more due to the fact that the MNF, in their models, is restricted in its choice of the 
profit-max1m1zing  transfer price rather than to it being a "multinational" firm.  
 
  
 
